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I. INTRODUCTION
Many of the legal profession's disciplinary rules are of ven-
erable lineage. For example, the provisions of contemporary
disciplinary codes concerning conflicts of interest' derive from
the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics (Canons), which, in
turn, can be traced back to late nineteenth century state ethics
codes, 2 to mid-nineteenth-century lectures and writings,3 and to
t Stein Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. A.B.
1978, Princeton University; J.D. 1981, Columbia University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Alabama State Bar Ass'n, Code of Ethics, 118 Ala. xxii,
mxviii (1899), reprinted in THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS:
TEX"r, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION TOPICS app. 1-34 (1985). See generally Alli-
son Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama
State Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471 (1998) (comparing Alabama's ethics
code to earlier writings of George Sharswood and to later state ethics codes).
3. See, e.g., DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 753 (2d ed.
1836), reprinted in SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 114; GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN
ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 109-10 (5th ed. 1884). See generally Russell
G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992) (describing the influence of Sharswood's
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earlier common-law agency principles.4 Although lawyers to-
day disagree about what the precise contours of the conflict
rules should be,5 these rules embody basic principles of loyalty,
competence and confidentiality that are fundamental, tradi-
tional, and universally supported by lawyers. These are defin-
ing principles for the practice of law. They are among the core
values of the legal profession.
The same cannot be said of the principles underlying the
particular disciplinary rules that lie at the center of the debate
about multidisciplinary practice. 6 These rules are of relatively
writings on the Canons).
4. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 301, 316-19 (1998) (explaining that although agency law provides
foundational structure for conflict rules, conflict rules depart from general
principles of agency law); Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation:
The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 99-103 (1996) (stating that al-
though "conflict rules are rooted in common law principles that are more than
a century old," they do not themselves establish standards of civil liability).
5. For example, there is disagreement about whether the conflict rules
should allow for screening. See Green, supra note 4, at 118 n.173 (citing com-
mentary).
6. The current debate about multidisciplinary practice was sparked by
the work of the Big Five accounting firms which employ thousands of lawyers
to assist in rendering services to their clients. It led the American Bar Asso-
ciation to appoint a Commission to study and make recommendations con-
cerning the subject. See COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE,
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REPORT (1999), available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mdpreport.html> [hereinafter REPORT].
The debate appears to be close kin to one waged several years ago on the
subject of "ancillary businesses"---that is, whether and under what circum-
stances lawyers and law firms should be able to provide law-related services
such as selling insurance, lobbying, preparing tax returns, providing counsel-
ing, or providing such services as financial planning or accounting. See gener-
ally Dennis J. Block et al., Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.7: Its Origin
and Interpretation, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739 (1992); Stephen R. Ripps,
Law Firm Ownership of Ancillary Businesses In Ohio-A New Era?, 27 AKRON
L. REV. 1 (1993); Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Professional-
ism: The ABA's Ancillary Business Debate as a Case Study, 35 ARIZ. L. REV.
363 (1993).
In truth, the idea of multidisciplinary practice is nothing new, and credit
for the idea goes to the solo practitioners, who for years have contemplated
bringing legal assistance and other forms of professional assistance under one
roof, either by themselves engaging in dual professional practice-that is,
practicing law in conjunction with another profession, see generally LAWRENCE
J. RAIMAN & JEAN A HINLICKY, ETHICAL ISSUES IN DUAL PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE 1 (1982)-or by entering into a formal arrangement with a member
of another profession to provide legal services and other professional services
to their clients. As this Article discusses, ethics rules, as drafted by the
American Bar Association (ABA) and interpreted by bar association ethics
opinions, blocked their way, however. For more than 80 years, bar committees
1116
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recent vintage. They provide that lawyers may not be em-
ployed by a corporation to render services to third parties,7 that
lawyers and nonlawyers may not enter into partnerships to
render legal services,8 that lawyers may not share legal fees
with nonlawyers, 9 and that lawyers may not aid nonlawyers in
the unauthorized practice of law.'0 The premise of these rules
is essentially that, when lawyers practice law, they must avoid
the corrupting influence of nonlawyers (other than, of course,
their own clients); clients are best served by lawyers who pre-
serve their "professional independence" by avoiding unholy al-
liances with the laity."
Although this principle, equating professional independ-
ence with professional isolation, is neither fundamental, nor de-
fining, nor universally shared by lawyers, those who oppose
multidisciplinary practice rally under the banner of core val-
ues. Their argument is not that the restrictions embody core
values, but that they protect core values such as "independence
of judgment, loyalty to the client, preservation of confidences,
competence, avoiding improper solicitation, and support for pro
bono activities and improving the legal system."12 They raise
the specter that, if the disciplinary restrictions are loosened to
allow lawyers to ally more freely with other professionals-for
example, to allow lawyers to practice law as partners and em-
ployees of accountants, or to allow elder law attorneys and so-
cial workers to become partners-lawyers are likely to succumb
to the improper influence of their nonlawyers allies, sell out
their clients, divulge client confidences, represent clients in-
eptly, violate solicitation rules, and disregard their public obli-
gations. Opponents argue that, at the very least, advocates of
have consistently held that lawyers' rules of professional conduct foreclose
multidisciplinary practices and partnerships, thereby discouraging individual
lawyers from either personally rendering multiple professional services or
teaming up with accountants, social workers, real estate and insurance bro-
kers, and other licensed professionals and business people. See infra notes 97-
153 and accompanying text.
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(d) (1983).
8. See id. Rule 5.4(b).
9. See id. Rule 5.4(a).
10. See id. Rule 5.5(b).
11. See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the
One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 600-16
(1989) (identifying and critiquing the rules' premises).
12. Executive Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Statement of Position on Multidisciplinary Practice, 54 RECORD ASSN B.
CITY N.Y. 585, 596 (1999).
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reform should have the "burden of proof' on the question of
whether the profession's core values could be preserved under a
less restrictive regulatory regime. So far, the organized bar has
tended to accept this argument, challenging proponents of mul-
tidisciplinary practice to prove that lawyers who ally with ac-
countants or other professionals will continue to adhere to the
legal profession's most fundamental norms.1 3
Perhaps it would be fair to assign reformers this burden if
the applicable disciplinary restrictions had been devised in re-
sponse to demonstrated harm caused by nonlawyers' exercise of
influence over lawyers. A presumption in favor of the existing
rules might also be warranted if the actual motivation for the
restrictions had been to protect the legal profession's basic val-
ues rather than to thwart competition, or if the need for restric-
tions of this nature could fairly be characterized as a matter of
popular wisdom, given the persuasiveness of the core values ra-
tionale for the restrictions or, at the very least, the legal profes-
sion's undivided and undeviating adherence to this rationale.
As this Article discusses, however, the restrictions on multidis-
ciplinary practice and the core values rationale for them have a
more equivocal history.
II. THE STATUTORY ANTECEDENT TO THE
CONTEMPORARY DISCIPLINARY RESTRICTIONS:
NEW YORK'S EXCLUSION OF CORPORATIONS
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW
At the turn of the twentieth century, when the ABA
drafted its first ethics code, the Canons, 14 the ABA did not
identify a professional obligation to avoid lay influence. Yet,
the disciplinary rules that now restrict multidisciplinary prac-
tice do have early analogues. For example, in 1768, Boston
13. On August 10, 1999, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution
sponsored by the Florida Bar providing:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association make no change,
addition or amendment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
which permits a lawyer to offer legal services through a multidisci-
plinary practice unless and until additional study demonstrates that
such changes will further the public interest without sacrificing or
compromising lawyer independence and the legal profession's tradi-
tion of loyalty to clients.
Florida Bar Recommendation Before the House of Delegates at the Am. Bar
Ass'n Annual Meeting in Atlanta (Aug. 10, 1999), available at <http'//www.
abanet.org/cpr/flbarrec.html>.
14. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs (1908).
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lawyers agreed on a set of rules for self-governance that in-
cluded a pledge not to assist in the prosecution of actions
brought by individuals who were not regularly admitted to
practice law in the county.15 But the common-law judicial deci-
sions, the writings of nineteenth-century lawyers, and the late
nineteenth-century state ethics codes were essentially silent on
this subject of professional associations between lawyers and
laymen 16 and, consequently, the original Canons contained no
provision specifically addressing it.' 7
Although the general concern about professionalism un-
derlying the eventual restrictions animated many of the origi-
nal Canons, the particular concern about lawyer-nonlawyer al-
liances was just bubbling to the surface as the Canons neared
completion.' 8 The impetus was the practice of law by corpora-
tions. In 1908, it was apparently a hornbook principle of
agency law that corporations could employ lawyers to represent
15. See SUFFOLK COUNTY BAR BOOK 1770-1805, at 10 (1882). The lawyers
agreed that:
The gentlemen of the bar of the county of Essex esteeming it detri-
mental to the public, that persons not regularly admitted and sworn
as attorneys should receive the countenance of the barristers and at-
torneys who are of this county and are regular practisers, agree
unanimously that they will not enter, argue, or in any manner assist
in the prosecution of actions brought by such persons without the
consent of the bar.
Id. The restriction appears to apply equally to attorneys practicing in other
counties as well as to nonattorneys.
16. This is unsurprising given that, in the nineteenth century, restrictions
on nonlawyers' practice generally did not extend much beyond courtroom rep-
resentation and barriers to entry into the legal profession were low. Since
anyone could provide legal assistance outside the courtroom and virtually
anyone could qualify to do so inside the courtroom, the distinction between
lawyers and nonlawyers was not of great significance. The late nineteenth
century "professionalism project" began with efforts to raise the standards for
qualifying for a law license and to expand the areas of practice from which
nonlawyers would be excluded. Only in the early twentieth century, as the
distinction between lawyers and nonlawyers became of increasing practical
importance, did the organized bar focus on lawyers' professional relationships
with nonlawyers.
17. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs (1908).
18. Analogous concerns associated with the rise of the medical profession
at the turn of the century led to both American Medical Association ethical re-
strictions and state statutory restrictions on doctors' associations with corpo-
rations. See generally Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate Practice of
Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40
VAND. L. REV. 445 (1987). The medical profession was forced to liberalize its
restrictions in the mid-1970s because of the Federal Trade Commission's ap-
plication of the antitrust law. Id. at 475-78.
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third parties in litigation. 19 The following year, however, at the
bar's prompting, New York adopted a penal law designed to
remove corporations from the field of law.20 The new law made
it a misdemeanor for a corporation to practice law, "to render or
furnish legal services or advice, or to furnish attorneys or coun-
sel or to render legal services of any kind."21
Samuel Marsh, a New York lawyer, received credited for
originating this legislation. 22 In a letter to the editor of the
New York Law Journal published on February 26, 1909, Marsh
called attention "to the unusual activity of several business
corporations in soliciting and obtaining agreements retaining
them to institute and prosecute legal proceedings for the collec-
tion of claims of various kinds .... '2 3 Marsh urged state and
local bar associations to "lose no time in securing amendatory
legislation" to remove corporations from the field.24
When he wrote the letter, Marsh claimed no personal fa-
miliarity with the actual practice of corporations that had en-
tered the field of law. His understanding was based on his re-
view of one corporation's certificate of incorporation and on
newspaper advertisements for corporations offering to provide
assistance on legal matters.25 What prompted his letter was an
appellate decision reported about a week earlier referring to a
corporation that had undertaken to prosecute condemnation
proceedings on behalf of another party.26 The court had been
indifferent to the corporation's role. 27
Marsh asserted that the corporations' work was unlawful
under existing statutes which provided that only duly licensed
19. See, e.g., Julius Henry Cohen, The Illegal Practice of the Law vs. The
Unprofessional Practice of the Law, 23 AM. LEGAL NEWS 5, 7 (1912) ('A corpo-
ration formed to carry on a collection agency, may employ attorneys to collect
the claims and charge their fees against the client.'" (quoting 1 MECHUM ON
AGENCY § 56, at 53 (1908) (citing Snow, Church & Co. v. Hall, 44 N.Y.S. 427
(App. Div. 1897)))).
20. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 280 (1909).
21. Id.
22. See Brief of Petitioner at 5, In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15
(N.Y. 1910) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief] (stating that Marsh "is apparently
the person who originated this legislation against legal corporations").
23. S.M. [Samuel Marsh], Correspondence, Rendition of Professional Serv-
ices by Corporations, 40 N.Y. L.J., 2272, 2272 (1909).
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
1120 [Vol. 84:1115
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attorneys were permitted to represent parties to a litigation.28
He did not presuppose, however, that the corporations' clients
were receiving advice from laymen or that laymen were ap-
pearing on clients' behalf in court. On the contrary, he ac-
knowledged that the corporations hired licensed attorneys to
conduct the litigation and appear as counsel of record.29 But
Marsh insisted that this merely aggravated the illegality.30 He
argued that even if the legal work was handled by lawyers on
their staff, the corporations were, in effect, practicing law, con-
trary to statutory provisions which confine legal practice to in-
dividuals who have studied law, passed rigorous examinations
as to their legal knowledge and character, and submitted to ju-
dicial regulation.31
As commentators have noted, this argument was logically
unsound.32 Although lawyers were allied with corporations, in
that the lawyers were employed by them or contracted with
them to receive referrals, it did not follow that the corporations
were "practicing law." Corporations did not appear in court-
licensed attorneys did. The corporation's function was to
attract clients and refer them to lawyers. That function could
not have comprised the practice of law even under the broadest
definition. In those days, the bar expected lawyers to obtain
clients primarily by word of mouth-that is, through lay
referrals. While the corporations, unlike friends and neighbors,
may have profited by recommending lawyers, it does not follow
28. See id.
29. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 22, at 5.
30. See id.
31. See id. Marsh noted:
It seems to me very strange... that three or more persons who may
never have had a law book in their hands, whose character may never
have been subjected to the scrutiny of any court or other body, may,
by merely signing and filing a certificate of incorporation.., become
entitled to appear in judicial proceedings and conduct any litigation.
Id. This argument was disingenuous since, as Marsh knew, it was lawyers
who appeared in court and conducted the litigation.
Marsh also reasoned that the corporations' lawyers lacked legal authority
to appear in court on behalf of the parties because the parties did not deal di-
rectly with the lawyers. See id. This argument was later to be abandoned in
the face of the corporations' explanation that they merely referred lawyers to
their subscribers, and that the lawyers in fact interacted directly with the cli-
ents. See infra notes 36, 38.
32. See I. MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN INCORPORATED 164 (1931)
("If corporations ... are to be excluded from [the practice of law], the justifica-
tion for doing so must be rested not on logic or sound theory but upon consid-
erations of public policy and general welfare."); Andrews, supra note 11, at
600-01 (dismissing the argument as "spurious" and "facile").
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profited by recommending lawyers, it does not follow that they
were practicing law in doing so. Nonetheless, in the months
that followed, the idea that by making referrals corporations
were indirectly practicing law became the cornerstone of the
bar's effort to beat back corporations that were encroaching on
its turf.
33
A mere two months elapsed from Marsh's call to arms until
the New York legislature acted,34 by which point several exist-
ing corporations took alarm. These were well-capitalized com-
panies which boasted reputable directors. They employed staff
counsel to provide legal advice to clients or referred the clients
to private lawyers. The companies did not believe that they
represented the "evils" against which the legislation was di-
rected.35 At least one of them, the Credit Clearing House, sent
a representative to public hearings on the bills in an effort to
dissuade Governor Charles Evans Hughes, the future Chief
Justice of the United States, from signing them into law.36 Two
33. In later years, this argument remained a mainstay of the bar in its
efforts against corporate involvement in the legal field. See, e.g., REPORT OF
SPECIAL COMMITrEE OF THE CONFERENCE OF BAR ASSOCIATION DELEGATES
To PREPARE A BRIEF FOR THE USE OF STATE AND LOCAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS 5
(1920) [hereinafter REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE] ("That a corporation can-
not practice law is axiomatic. It is not a natural person, it possesses neither
learning, good character, nor capacity to take an oath, or to preserve and oc-
cupy a personally confidential relation with a client."); Definition by the Spe-
cial Committee of the New York State Bar Ass'n, in REPORT OF SPECIAL
COM1ITTEE, supra, at 53 ("[I]f the actual service of a lawyer is rendered in the
performance of the task, the layman furnishing such service is practicing
law-he is offering the service of persons presumably qualified to give expert
advice in the field of law.").
34. Two bills were drafted, offered to the intermediate appellate court in
Manhattan for review, modified slightly (apparently in response to the con-
cerns of title companies and legal aid societies), then introduced by two mem-
bers of the state assembly in March 1909. The legislature passed the laws in
April 1909 in the waning hours of the legislative session without committee
hearings and, apparently, without much fanfare. See Petitioner's Brief, supra
note 22, at 2-6 (describing legislative history).
35. See Transcript of May 14, 1909 hearing upon Assembly Bill, number
1830, entitled "An Act to Amend the Penal Law, in Relation to Corporations
Practicing Law" [hereinafter Transcript], in Petitioner's Appeal from Order at
23, In re Co-Operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1910) [hereinafter Appeal]
(testimony of a representative of the Credit Clearing House) ("They are aiming
at an evil which we all agree is an evil. They have provided a law in its terms
so broad that it strikes down perfectly legitimate business as well as illegiti-
mate business.").
36. As described by its representative, the company had been in business
for half a century, had "a capital and surplus of eight hundred thousand dol-
lars, and.., men like Clarence Whitman and Sir Frederick Bordon as direc-
1122 [Vol. 84:1115
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others, the Co-operative Law Company 37 and the Associated
Lawyers' Company,38 would later become the subject of litiga-
tion concerning the new law.39
It was unclear whether the statutes were in fact directed at
these companies. If Marsh, the legislative sponsors, the legis-
lators who voted for the bill, or Governor Hughes meant cate-
gorically to remove established corporations such as these from
the field of law, they may never have publicly owned up to it.
tors," Appeal, supra note 35, at 23, had a staff of attorneys as well as "nine or
ten thousand attorneys under contract" throughout the world. Id. at 20-21.
The company's subscribers received advice from staff attorneys concerning
commercial law-for example, whether a debt was usurious, or whether a suit
to collect on a debt would be barred by the statute of limitations. See id. at 21.
Where the subscriber determined to bring suit, the company would recom-
mend a lawyer, with whom the subscriber would enter directly into a lawyer-
client relationship. See id. at 21-22 (providing testimony of a representative of
the Credit Clearing House).
37. According to its court filings, the Co-operative Law Company was in-
corporated in 1901 for the purpose of "furnish[ing] to its subscribers legal ad-
vice and service" and, in connection with this, "operat[ing] ... a staff of compe-
tent attorneys and counselors-at-law to give such advice; and to prosecute or
defend, through such counsel, any claim or suit entrusted to its care by sub-
scribers." Appeal, supra note 35, at 5-6. Its officers and directors included
bank officers, a physician, an officer of a grocers' association and a manufac-
turers' association-all chosen, according to the company, "from the prominent
banking, commercial and professional interests of the city"-and its attorneys
were said to be "men of ability and professional standing." Id. at 6-8. As the
company described its practice, subscribers paid a $10 annual fee which enti-
tled them to receive legal advice from lawyers furnished by the corporation.
See id. at 8. Subscribers could then retain the company's lawyers for addi-
tional legal services as needed. The company's legal staff "transact[ed] ... a
general law business, including the prosecution and defence of suits; incorpo-
ration of business enterprises; drawing of contracts, leases and agreements;
drawing and probating of wills, management of estates, etc." Id. A significant
aspect of this law practice related to "the collection of claims," including both
the prosecution and defense of lawsuits to collect on debts. Id. at 8-9. Litiga-
tion was brought or defended in the name of the company's managing attor-
ney, not the company itself. See id. at 9. The company's board of directors did
not interfere in "the confidential relations of counsel to client," but supervised
and controlled "matters of general policy" such as "the general schedule of fees
for legal services," thereby "insurfing] to clients of the Company efficient legal
service at equitable rates." Id. at 8.
38. The Associated Lawyers' Company was incorporated "to do a general
law and collection business" and had a capital stock of $125,000. In re Associ-
ated Lawyers' Co., 119 N.Y.S. 77, 77-78 (App. Div. 1909). All but five of its
stockholders were practicing lawyers. Id. The company's filings indicated
that it employed as many as 6,000 practicing lawyers in various parts of the
country, and "when suits need[ed to be brought, they [were] entrusted specifi-
cally to lawyers who appeared] in their own name." Id.
39. See In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1910); Associated
Lawyers' Co., 119 N.Y.S. at 77.
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Indicating to the contrary was a letter secured by the Co-
operative Law Company's managing attorney from the chair-
man of the Assembly Codes Committee a few days before the
gubernatorial hearing.40
A provision of the penal statute could easily have been read
to "grandfather" the reputable, established corporations, and
perhaps even to allow the incorporation of new ones, subject to
judicial approval. It appears that, as originally drafted, the law
included a single exception for corporations "lawfully engaged
in a business authorized by the provisions of any existing stat-
ute."41 As ultimately enacted, the exception extended, addi-
tionally, to corporations that examined and insured titles to
real property, corporations that employed in-house lawyers to
represent the corporation itself, and "organizations organized
for benevolent or charitable purposes" to "assist[] persons with-
out means in the pursuit of any civil remedy.., whose exis-
tence, organization or incorporation may be approved by the
appellate division," the state's intermediate appellate court.42
Although this exception was ambiguous, conceivably it
would have allowed existing companies to obtain judicial ap-
proval to continue to direct business to lawyers. It might even
have been read to allow a new corporation, established for a le-
gitimate purpose other than the practice of law, to seek ap-
proval to direct business to lawyers incidental to its primary
function. In either case, the courts might have established li-
censing standards for corporations and a mechanism for en-
forcing them, thereby subjecting the corporations to a regula-
tory regime comparable to the attorney licensing process. 43
40. The letter, included in the company's filings in the Court of Appeals,
stated:
"I am surprised to learn that any of the provisions of this bill will in
any way hamper the work which the Co-operative Law Company has
been doing since its organization in 1901. I have had ample opportu-
nity to become acquainted with that work, and I most certainly would
not have approved the... bill had I thought it would hamper your
work."
Appeal, supra note 35, at 14-15 (quoting letter of Assemblyman Charles F.
Murphy).
41. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 22, at 4.
42. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 280 (1909).
43. Cf Transcript, supra note 35, at 23 (testimony of a representative of
the Credit Clearing House). The representative suggested that regulatory
concerns about law practice by legitimate corporations:
can be taken care of by providing that the organization of these com-
panies shall be subject to the Supreme Court in the same way as the
organization of charitable institutions, and if need be we should have
[Vol. 84:11151124
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At a public hearing in the state capital, Governor Hughes
expressed his plain understanding that an appellate court
could authorize an established corporation to continue its work
if the corporation was "lawfully engaged in its business, pro-
vided it obtains approval of the Appellate Division."44 Dis-
missing corporate representatives' fear that only legal aid so-
cieties would be able to seek judicial approval, Hughes
observed, "[starting with this being a penal statute, and taking
the ordinary meanings of construction as they would be applied
in the ordinary case directed against an alleged misdemeanor, I
do not see at the moment any answer to the matter."45 Samuel
Marsh, who was present at the hearing, concurred in this in-
terpretation, stating, "I have no desire to interfere with any-
body's legitimate business, and able counsel can very well con-
form to existing law."46 Neither Hughes nor Marsh suggested
any reason why courts might lack authority to approve the on-
going existence of companies like those whose representatives
appeared at the hearing. On the other hand, perhaps cagily,
neither man affirmed that these companies should be granted
judicial approval.
It was left to the state courts to determine whether to ex-
empt established companies from the penal law's reach, and at
first it appeared they would do so. In June 1909, three months
before the law went into effect, the intermediate appellate court
in Brooklyn, New York, authorized the Co-operative Law Com-
pany to continue its business pursuant to the terms of its cer-
tificate of incorporation. 47 Four months later, however, the
Manhattan appellate court, which had previously vetted the
law, denied similar approval to the Associated Lawyers' Com-
pany.48 Contrary to Governor Hughes, it reasoned that "the
only authority given to this court is to approve 'organizations
organized for benevolent or charitable purposes,' 49 thereby
rendering meaningless the exception for corporations whose
business had been authorized by an existing statute. The court
a commissioner appointed by the Governor to oversee all corporations
which furnish attorneys.
Id.
44. Id. at 18 (statement of Governor Hughes).
45. Id. at 25.
46. Id. at 24 (testimony of Mr. Marsh).
47. See In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15, 16 (N.Y. 1910).
48. See In re Associated Lawyers' Co., 119 N.Y.S. 77, 79 (App. Div. 1909).
49. Id. at 78 (quoting NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 280 (1909)).
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opined that it had never been legal for a corporation "to procure
attorneys for the transaction of the law business of its clients,"
and the statute did nothing more than eliminate doubts on that
score.50 With the Manhattan court's opinion in hand, Charles
J. McDermott, the chairman of the Brooklyn Bar Association's
Committee on Grievances, moved personally and on the bar's
behalf to vacate the Brooklyn court's order in favor of the Co-
operative Law Company.51
As the case wended its way to the state's highest court, the
bar's anticompetitive motivations came to the fore. McDer-
mott's primary concern was that the corporations' work "is dis-
advantageous and unfair to me as a practising member of the
bar of this state and others similarly situated" who had spent
"both time any money" to obtain a law license.52 The principal
unfairness he identified was that corporations could obtain cli-
ents by advertising, while it was not "proper" for lawyers to do
So.
5 3
50. Id.
51. See In re Co-operative Law Co., 120 N.Y.S. 1120 (App. Div. 1909); Ap-
peal, supra note 35, at 31 (affidavit of Charles J. McDermott).
52. Appeal, supra note 35, at 34 (affidavit of Charles J. McDermott). He
argued:
[Allowing said Co-operative Law Company to conduct [its] business
is disadvantageous and unfair to me as a practising member of the
bar of this state and others similarly situated, in that such a corpora-
tion is able, by means of its corporate capacity, powers, and associa-
tions, to solicit and advertise for business and thus in a manner and
to an extent, not proper or possible in the case of an individual law-
yer, to obtain business, and to have work of a legal character per-
formed by persons not admitted to practise law in this state.... I, as
well as other members of the bar of this state, have been required to
pass an examination and to have educational and other qualifications
requiring a fixed period of study and the expenditure of both time and
money, before obtaining a license to practise law in this state;
whereas said Co-operative Law Company is now and have been in
fact practising law without any preliminary qualification except the
observance of the formality of incorporation and the making of an ap-
plication to this Court.
Id.
53. Id. The quoted passage reflects two additional concerns. The first is
that corporations assigned legal work to individuals who were not members of
the state bar (here, it was unclear whether the complaint was about work per-
formed by laymen, by out-of-state lawyers, or both). The other was that the
mechanism for authorizing corporations to practice-namely, incorporation
and court authorization-were not as effective as the attorney licensing proc-
ess to ensure that the corporation was qualified to render the services it of-
fered. There was no suggestion, however, that clients were less well served by
the lawyers whom the corporation furnished than by lawyers whom the client
might have retained directly.
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Insofar as the corporations simply earned income by mar-
keting lawyers' services, it is not inevitable that their work
would have been economically disadvantageous to lawyers.
Conceivably, lawyers who otherwise would have been waiting
idly for clients to walk in the door, or who would have spent
uncompensated time marketing themselves in the indirect
ways then permitted, would receive a steadier stream of clients.
If they did not use the referrals solely as a way to attract cli-
ents for their nonlawyers services, the corporations might have
profited from this service,5 4 but the lawyers would not neces-
sarily have been disadvantaged. In effect, lawyers would have
transferred the distasteful marketing function to corporations,
which could perform it more efficiently, thereby leaving lawyers
in the same or better financial condition and, at the same time,
promoting professionalism by reducing lawyers' role as busi-
ness getters. Lawyers (or some lawyers) would have been dis-
advantaged only if, as might be anticipated, corporations used
their bargaining power to drive down lawyers' fees.55
Although McDermott complained that the bar was at the
mercy of corporations, in large measure the competition he
feared was internecine: The segment of the bar that as a matter
of professionalism would not accept referrals from corporations
was at a competitive disadvantage vis-&-vis the "unprofes-
sional" segment of the bar that was disposed to do so. His mo-
tion was another iteration of the professional elite's efforts
54. For example, the lawyers may have paid the corporations for the re-
ferrals, shared a portion of their fees, or simply agreed to accept moderately
lower fees from clients who were referred (thus allowing corporations to profit
by charging clients a fee for making the referrals).
55. To the extent that they were dealing with individual clients, lawyers
in a community-although in competition with each other-might collectively
keep fees at a certain level, rather than lower their fees in order to secure
business. This could have been achieved informally, as it arguably is today by
personal injury lawyers who insist on a "standard" percentage in contingent-
fee representation. See generally Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contin-
gency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247 (1998) (de-
scribing ABA Ethics Committee's response to letter requesting advice about
standard contingency fees in personal injury cases); Herbert M. Kritzer, The
Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L.
REV. 267, 287-88 (1998). This could even have been achieved formally via bar-
association-recommended "fee schedules," until the Supreme Court found the
practice to be in violation of antitrust law. See generally Thomas D. Morgan,
The Impact of Antitrust Law on the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 415
(1998). The professional cartel would have been less likely to withstand the
bargaining power of corporations, which might promise a steady stream of cli-
ents to lawyers who lowered their fees, or the promise of economic security to
a lawyer who would serve as a salaried employee.
1127
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
early in the twentieth century to stave off competition through
professional regulation.
It is no coincidence that advertising was at the heart of
McDermott's lament. As Jerold Auerbach has described, the
Canon prohibiting lawyers from advertising, along with several
others regulating lawyers' role in the marketplace, reflected the
class biases of the professional elite who controlled the bar as-
sociations; it was particularly directed at "struggling metropoli-
tan solo lawyers"56-increasingly, "foreign born lawyers,"57 re-
garded by the bar as of "inferior character"--"who worked in a
highly competitive urban market with a transient clientele"
and whose livelihood therefore depended on their ability to
market their services.5 8 Like the ethical ban on advertising,
the statutory ban on corporate law practice prevented foreign-
born urban lawyers of supposedly inferior character from using
offensive business practices to snatch clients away from well-
bred lawyers who had the financial means to wait for clients to
call and the social connections to ensure that clients would do
SO.
5 9
After the intermediate appellate court granted the bar's
motion 6o and the Co-operative Law Company appealed to the
state's highest court,61 Samuel Marsh contributed a thirty-four-
page memorandum of law explaining and defending the state
legislation, thereby offering the most complete picture of the
thinking behind the legislation.62 As before, Marsh drew on
56. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 43 (1976). For an examina-
tion of the professional elite's hostility toward the urban personal injury bar in
particular, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY 150-54
(1992).
57. AUERBACH, supra note 56, at 48.
58. Id. at 42-49. Auerbach explained:
The prohibition... instructed lawyers that success flowed from their
"character and conduct," not from aggressive solicitation. It thereby
rewarded the lawyer whose law-firm partners and social contacts
made advertising unnecessary at the same time that it attributed in-
ferior character and unethical behavior to attorneys who could not af-
ford to sit passively in their offices awaiting clients[.]
Id. at 43.
59. See id.
60. See In re Co-operative Law Co., 120 N.Y.S. 1120, 1120 (App. Div.
1909).
61. See Appeal, supra note 35, at 1-2.
62. The memorandum was appended to a short brief filed by the state At-
torney General, who had entered the case in support of the bar association's
position. See, Samuel Marsh, In re Rendition of Legal Services and Practices
of the Law by Business Corporations (1909) [hereinafter Marsh, Rendition of
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advertisements in the daily newspapers and stock certificates
to set the stage against which the legislation was enacted.63 By
1909, according to Marsh, a very large number of corporations
had been formed in New York State, and especially in New
York City, for the purpose of rendering legal services. 4 Marsh
was far from explicit about why corporations' role in helping
clients secure legal services should be a matter of public con-
cern. He identified no cases in which the corporations' sub-
scribers or "clients" had complained or been harmed.
To the extent that Marsh expressed his concerns explicitly,
like McDermott, he saw the primary evil as unfair competition.
Explaining the need for legislation addressing corporate in-
volvement in the field of law, Marsh wrote:
Such legislation is of special importance to young men, ambitious to
become lawyers through the methods prescribed by existing laws and
to those who have obtained the necessary license and have taken up
the practice as a profession. Corporations, such as have been hereto-
fore described, present new, and to young lawyers, almost insuperable
barriers to success. 5
Legal Services], in Brief on Behalf of Attorney General, In re Co-operative Law
Co., 92 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1910).
63. See Marsh, Rendition of Legal Services, supra note 62, at 2-11.
64. According to Marsh, while some corporations provided general legal
services, others confined themselves to specialized services or litigation, such
as handling personal injury claims, collecting debts for merchants, conducting
condemnation proceedings, or aiding in the administration and settlement of
estates. Id. at 2. Some limited their practice to the city or the state, while
others transacted business nationally. See id.
65. See id. at 26. Marsh's only other explicit concern applied principally,
if not exclusively, to corporations rendering legal services through nonlawyers
as distinguished from those furnishing lawyers to their customers. His argu-
ment was that members of the public may be misled to believe that they re-
ceive more protection by seeking legal services from a corporation than from a
lawyer. See id. at 27. Marsh reasoned that the general public may think that
certificates of incorporation have:
as much, if not greater, force as to [the corporations'] competency and
legal right to do business as the certificate of admission or license of
an attorney by the Supreme Court, while their apparent possession of
capital... is also naturally accepted as showing a responsibility to a
'client' which few of the attorneys yearly admitted, or in fact most of
all engaged in practice whenever admitted, possess.
Id. at 27. He argued that clients who deal with corporations are in truth "less
protected" than those dealing directly with lawyers, since the court cannot
summarily punish a corporation or attach its fimds, as the court may with a
lawyer. Id. This argument would not have applied with much force to a cor-
poration that simply furnished legal assistance to its customers through staff
lawyers or contract lawyers, since the lawyers themselves would be subject to
judicial regulation-including disbarment-for improper acts. Moreover, at
least as to these corporations, an outright ban on the delivery of legal services,
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Marsh's reference to young men who took up "the practice [of
law] as a profession" was telling, given the perennial debate
over whether law is a "profession" or a "business."66 His impli-
cation was that the lawyers who regarded law as a profession
would lose out to those who, treating law as a business, allied
with profit-seeking corporations that touted lawyers' availabil-
ity. The point was later made less subtly by Julius Henry
Cohen, a prominent New York lawyer67 and public opponent of
the corporations, 68 in the form of a parable about the well-bred
country lawyer and his low-borne city counterpart. 69
rather than more stringent regulation, would obviously have been overkill.
66. See, e.g., JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION?
(rev. ed. 1924). For recent evidence of this debate, see generally Symposium,
Conference on the Commercialization of the Legal Profession, 45 S.C. L. REV.
875 (1994); Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Dis-
carding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the
Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995).
67. See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 99 (1998). According to his
obituary in 1950, Cohen was born in Brooklyn, New York in 1873, graduated
from New York University in 1896, and was admitted to the New York Bar the
following year. See Julius Cohen, 77, Lawyer 53 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
1950, at 19. He served as counsel for the Transit Reform Committee of 100
from 1900 to 1905, as counsel for the Merchants Association, and from 1917 to
1942, as counsel to the New York Port Authority and its predecessor commis-
sion. See id. He was credited with promoting the arbitration of labor disputes
in the garment industry beginning around 1910, served in various government
positions, and was active in several bar associations. See id.; see also THOMAS
ALPHEUS MASON: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 297-315 (1946) (describing Cohen's role
in 1910 representation of garment manufacturers' association in labor dis-
pute). Today, Cohen may be best remembered in legal academic literature for
his role as chief spokesman in support of the Federal Arbitration Act. See gen-
erally JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW (1918);
Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12
VA. L. REV. 265 (1926).
68. See generally Julius Henry Cohen, The Illegal Practice of the Law vs.
The Unprofessional Practice of the Law 23 AM. LEGAL NEWS 5 (1912) [herein-
after The Illegal Practice].
69. We will say that you have made.., enough to send your son
through a university, through a law school, through a law office, and
that, finally-maintaining always the standards of the profession
which you yourself honor sufficiently to desire him enrolled in its
ranks--your son reaches the age of twenty-five or twenty-six and opens
up a law office in your city. His personal character, known to a few
friends, his diligence at college (and possibly respect and friendship for
you) bring him at first the small commercial litigation with which all
lawyers of the preceding generation began their practice. Gradually
(all the while, mind you, coming to "Dear Dad" for the occasional check
to make up deficits in office expenses) he gets to be known, toward the
thirties, as a keen, wide-awake chap, of knowledge in the law, good
judgment, a fine adviser, a good trial lawyer, thoroughly trustworthy
in all his dealings, respected by the courts and by his clients. Let us
1130
2000] DISCIPLINARY RESTRICTIONS ON MDPS 1131
Marsh's description of the corporations' promotional mate-
rial merely hinted at other evils. Marsh noted that "[tihe cor-
porate names are usually pretentious, and in some cases are
suggestive of a charitable or protective nature, the word 'pro-
tective' being very often used."70 And, referring to promotional
material offering the corporation's subscribers "advice upon all
questions of law" for an annual fee of $10,71 and, if the services
of counsel become necessary, "efficient services for a moderate
fee, 72 Marsh observed, "the last few sentences differ little from
the ancient quack advertisement 'Advice free, medicines full
price."-73 Clients could be misled about the nature of the serv-
ices rendered by these corporations. But Marsh did not identify
any clients who claimed to have been gulled, and one gets the
say that by thirty-five or thirty-six he has built up the best commercial
practice in your part of the country.
Now, there is in the same city the son of Thompson-of more or
less shady reputation-who got through some law school or other of
brief term, where a diploma was passport enough to secure admission
to the bar. He starts in, with little ability and with less character.
Indolent yet crafty, he soon becomes known in your part of the coun-
try for what he really is, until he scarce can find a client in the county
who will confide in him. Now comes along "The Lawyers' Touts, Inc.,"
whose particular business in life is to scour the country for law busi-
ness, and they offer your son the attractive opportunity of represent-
ing in your city the trade agencies, the collection agencies, the trade
associations of some of the large cities of the country-if he will but
pay them on the basis of the business they secure for him. Of course,
the proposition may not be put as bluntly as this. He will be asked to
insert his card in a "directory." But everyone knows it is pure tout-
ing .... Your son, we will say, because he has been properly bred and
trained, turns down the offer. Thompson's son accepts. Presently he
is the leading bankruptcy lawyer in town and your son-has the
character and respect of your community but not much else. Let us
assume, however, that in spite of the unfair competition, your son
continues to maintain his practice. Thompson's son, however, brings
a new reputation to your community. You suddenly awaken to the
fact that it is a place where men are readily petitioned into bank-
ruptcy, where there are "quick settlements," and your friends ... be-
gin to think of the whole profession (which includes your son, do not
forget) as ... "a... hocus-pocus science, that smiles in yer face while
it picks yer pocket...."
COHEN, supra note 66, at 174-75. Cohen's parable suggests that, at least in
his mind, what distinguished the professional elite's unworthy competitors
was not so much religious or ethnic differences, or their adherence to the busi-
ness rather than professional ethos (after all, in Cohen's story, the manufac-
turer respected the standards of the legal profession), but differences of social
and economic class.
70. Marsh, Rendition of Legal Services, supra note 62, at 4.
71. Id. at 8-9.
72. Id. at 9.
73. Id.
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impression that his larger complaint was simply that the cor-
porate names and promotional materials were in bad taste.
There was more than a hint about the need to preserve the
practice of law as a profession and that the ubiquitous adver-
tisements for corporations furnishing legal services were con-
trary to the legal profession's values, which regarded advertis-
ing as demeaning.74
After hearing argument, the court of appeals agreed with
the intermediate court that the company could not secure court
approval because it was not, and never had been, legally proper
for a corporation to practice law.75 Echoing Marsh's original
argument, it reasoned that the practice of law is a personal
right available only to individual members of the bar who had
been found to have the requisite education and character, who
had taken an oath of office, and who thereby had submitted to
the court's regulatory process. 76 Since a corporation could not
perform these conditions, "the practice of law is not a lawful
business for a corporation to engage in., 7 Further, the court
said, a corporation was forbidden from practicing law "indi-
rectly."78 Therefore, just as corporations had previously been
forbidden from engaging in other "learned professions" such as
medicine or dentistry by hiring doctors or dentists to act for
them, corporations were forbidden from "hir[ing] lawyers to
carry on the business of practicing law for it." 79
Although much of its opinion was formalistic, the court
also offered a policy justification for the legislation. The court's
theory essentially was that the corporations' lay directors
would corrupt the lawyers with whom they dealt, thereby
causing the lawyers to seek profits at the expense of their cli-
ents' interests and to ignore their obligation to aid in the ad-
ministration of justice.80 At long last, the idea was elaborated
74. See id. at 6-7, 10 (noting repeatedly that, among the officers and direc-
tors of these corporations, lawyers were far outnumbered by laymen). Marsh
also implied either that the legal services offered by the corporations might be
rendered by nonlawyers or, arguably, that nonlawyers would improperly inter-
fere with how lawyers advised or represented the clients. See id. But this also
was, at most, an implication, and Marsh documented no cases in which clients
had been advised by nonlawyers or ill-represented by lawyers.
75. See In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15, 16 (N.Y. 1910).
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The court explained:
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that a restriction on alliances between lawyers and laymen was
meant to protect clients, not simply to protect the bar, or cer-
tain of its members, from competition or to protect the reputa-
tion of the bar as a whole. 81 Of course, the court did not sub-
stantiate its premise that lawyers employed by corporations
would subordinate their clients' interests to the mercenary in-
terests of the corporations' lay directors. Further, this premise
was somewhat at odds with the court's other belief that corpo-
rations must be excluded from the practice of law because they
could not submit to the attorney licensing process. 82 After all,
if one were confident that the licensing process ensured that
individuals admitted to the bar had the requisite character to
practice law and, thus, would adhere to the legal profession's
values, there would be little need to fear that lawyers would
submit to the bad influence of laymen. Nonetheless, the court's
avowed fear was to become the intellectual foundation for the
disciplinary restrictions on multidisciplinary practice.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISCIPLINARY RULES
Over the two decades following enactment of the New York
statutes, approximately half the states adopted similar laws, 83
but this did not sound the death knell for corporations seeking
to enter the field. Surveying the landscape in 1931, Fordham
The relation of attorney and client is that of master and servant in a
limited and dignified sense, and it involves the highest trust and con-
fidence. It cannot be delegated without consent, and it cannot exist
between an attorney employed by a corporation to practice law for it,
and a client of the corporation, for he would be subject to the direc-
tions of the corporation and not to the directions of the client .... The
corporation would control the litigation, the money earned would be-
long to the corporation, and the attorney would be responsible to the
corporation only. His master would not be the client but the corpora-
tion, conducted it may be wholly by laymen, organized simply to make
money and not to aid in the administration of justice which is the
highest function of an attorney and counselor at law. The corporation
might not have a lawyer among its stockholders, directors or officers.
Its members might be without character, learning or standing ....
The bar, which is an institution of the highest usefulness and stand-
ing, would be degraded if even its humblest member became subject
to the orders of a money-making corporation engaged not in conduct-
ing litigation for itself, but in the business of conducting litigation for
others.
Id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See WORMSER, supra note 32, at 164.
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law professor I. Maurice Wormser, one of the period's preemi-
nent corporations scholars, observed that:
the active practice of law in many fields is no longer a matter at all
for attorneys. Title, insurance, trust, indemnity, collection and other
corporations are spreading their tentacles over large segments of the
lawyer's domain. It has been estimated that corporations to-day per-
form 60 per cent of corporate law work.8
Wormser further noted that "[tihese encroachments by corpora-
tions have caused much economic loss and consequent discon-
tent among members of the bar,"85 but that laymen, particu-
larly businessmen, found corporations preferable to lawyers,86
and not without reason.87
Against the background of public indifference to their
cause, bar leaders rallied support among lawyers.8 8 Although
84. See id. at 164-65. Wormser continued:
Corporations themselves now generally are organized by corporations.
In metropolitan newspapers can be read such advertisements a this:
"Corporations organized, New York, New Jersey, $90. Delaware, $80.
Includes fees and outfit." The defense of negligence suits has been
taken over almost entirely by indemnity and insurance corporations.
The handling of wills and estates is no longer the exclusive province
of lawyers. Most estates and trusts today are administered by corpo-
rations .... Title searching has passed out of [the attorney's] hands
into those of title and real estate companies, which assert they are
more competent and responsible.
Id.
85. Id. at 165. He stated "Lawyers complain in particular that corpora-
tions are permitted to advertise whereas the ethics of their profession preclude
them from doing so." Id.
86. Wormser noted:
[T]here exists a strong sentiment among laymen in favor of the per-
formance by corporations of many kinds of legal services which for
years had been considered within the exclusive and licit domain of the
lawyer. In certain types of readily standardized legal work the busi-
ness man feels the superiority of the corporation is obvious. The
community seemingly approves of the drafting of legal papers by title
and trust companies and banks. It sanctions the common method of
incorporating through large companies employed for that purpose
rather than through lawyers or firms of lawyers .... The layman
seems to feel that the lawyer is frequently careless and irresponsible.
Id. at 169-70.
87. Wormser observed:
[C]orporations possess many attractive advantages, among them be-
ing large scale organization; the use of modern business methods; the
standardization of certain types of legal work; their continuous, in-
deed perpetual life; business responsibility; wide experience and con-
nections, as well as contacts superior to those possessed by the aver-
age attorney.
Id. at 171.
88. See Andrews, supra note 11, at 585 (discussing a 1920 ABA report
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bar leaders continued to acknowledge that their motivation was
primarily to protect lawyers' livelihood,89 they condemned the
corporations (without a trace of irony) on the ground that "[the
practice of law is not a business for commercial exploitation"90
and therefore must be practiced by professionals, not profit-
driven entities.91 Bar leaders invoked the need to secure law-
yers' professional independence as one reason why lawyers
should not work with corporations, 92 but their principal reason
remained that corporations advertised the availability of legal
services,93 a vice in which only lawyers without conscience
"condemning professional associations between lawyers and nonlawyers").
89. Cohen explained:
The one who suffers most through illegal practice of the law by collec-
tion agencies, is the young lawyer just admitted to the bar .... [T]he
young lawyer who has studied his Code of Ethics and the authorities,
finds himself at the peril of disbarment or criminal conviction, if he
attempts to engage in a mercantile enterprise for the obtaining of
business. Yet, he may find in the office adjoining his, a business
man-not a lawyer--calling himself "COLLECTION AGENCY," cir-
cularizing, advertising, campaigning for clients to bring law suits, and
offering all kinds of inducements.
Cohen, The Illegal Practice, supra note 68, at 15. He further noted:
It is not merely the growing practice of the young lawyer that suffers
from these conditions, but the law practice that has been built up
through years of earnest and faithful service to clients, suffers too.
The mere fact that there exists in the field, men who offer to perform
legal services "at bargain-counter rates," makes it attractive for even
the oldest clients to "shop about," and if, in addition, eager soliciting
lawyers, uninformed as to the danger to themselves, engage in like
competition, the practice of the best commercial law office is bound to
suffer in the long run.
Id.
90. A.H. Robins, Is It Professional for Lawyers to Draw Wills for Trust
Companies Where Such Business Is Secured by Advertising?, 79 CENTRAL L.J.111, 113 (1914).
91. See id.
92. See WORMSER, supra note 32, at 176-77 (describing report of New
York County Lawyers' Association).
93. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITrEE OF THE CONFERENCE OF
BAR ASSOCIATION DELEGATES To PREPARE A BRIEF FOR THE USE OF STATE
AND LOCAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS: STATEMENT AND BRIEF ON WHAT ACTS
CONSTITUTE PRACTICE OF LAW AND WHAT CONSTITUTE UNLAWFUL PRACTICE
THEREOF 6 (1920). The report explained:
The sole inducement to the layman to practice law and do law busi-
ness is the fee derived therefrom, and to secure this recourse is had to
the ordinary commercial, competitive business methods of solicitation
and advertising thereby commercializing the profession of law and
the law business, undermining the ethical and professional stan-
dards, and destroying public confidence in the lawyers and the courts
with a clamor for recall ofjudges and decisions. The layman, a natu-
ral person or corporate, may only compete with the lawyer in the
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would indulge.94 Even among their fellows, this reasoning was
not universally persuasive.9 5 But lawyers willing to defend al-
liances with corporations publicly were in the minority, and
their straightforward defense of the practice as harmless
lacked rhetorical force when measured against opponents' ref-
erences to "bloodless" corporations and "professional prostitu-
tion" of their lawyers.96
In the end, bar association leaders did not need to per-
suade the public or even fellow lawyers. Courts had given the
organized bar (to an even greater extent than today) control
over the instruments of lawyer regulation, allowing bar leaders
to strike at corporations through the control of the processes of
establishing and enforcing professional standards. Although
the original Canons were silent on whether lawyers could be
employed by corporations or otherwise collaborate with laymen,
this was not an intractable problem. The organized bar devised
another vehicle for formally elaborating professional standards:
opinions published by a bar association concerning the propri-
ety of specific lawyer conduct.97 The New York County Law-
practice of the law and the doing of law business by orally soliciting or
advertising to do it more expeditiously, faithfully, intelligently, and at
less expense than the lawyer, thereby imputing to the lawyer sloth-
fulness, infidelity, and extortion. A loss of confidence in the courts
and lawyers is a sign of governmental decline, and a forerunner of
disintegration and anarchy.
94. Id. For expressions of this view, see, for example, COHEN, supra note
66, at 176-77.
95. As one Missouri lawyer put it, in response to a 1914 survey about
whether a lawyer-employee of a trust company may draw wills for the com-
pany's clients:
As I understand the case stated the [trust company], in its advertise-
ments and solicitations for business, proposes to furnish its patrons
legal advice with very little or no cost to its, (the trust company's,) pa-
trons. The trust company pays its attorneys for services rendered to
it either an annual salary or so much for services rendered in each
particular case. It seems to me that the trust company has a perfect
right to advertise for business in that way and so extend to its pa-
trons the services of its skilled attorneys in the matter of drawing
wills and deeds and that the trust company's attorneys are guilty of
no ethical wrong as the attorneys do not advertise for the business
and are not responsible for the advertisements or the attitude of the
trust company toward its patrons.
Robins, supra note 90, at 112 (paraphrasing R.A. Mooneyham).
96. Id. at 113 (paraphrasing Charles L. Hays).
97. For commentary skeptical of the significance of bar ethics opinions in
the context of professional regulation, see generally Jorge L. Carro, The Ethics
Opinions of the Bar: A Valuable Contribution or an Exercise in Futility?, 26
IND. L. REv. 1 (1992); Ted Finman & Theodore Schneyer, The Role of Bar As-
sociation Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the
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yers' Association, the first bar association to establish a com-
mittee for this purpose, rendered its first opinion in 1912.98 A
decade later, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
and the American Bar Association (ABA) followed suit.99
In the first two decades following the publication of the
Canons, the two New York bar associations issued opinions
condemning a variety of professional relationships between
lawyers and laymen. They held that lawyers are forbidden
from forming partnerships with nonlawyers, including not only
members of other professions but also out-of-state lawyers; 1°°
that lawyers are forbidden from dividing fees with nonlaw-
yers; 101 and, consistent with the 1909 state statute, that corpo-
rations may not employ lawyers to render legal assistance. 10 2
Although the bar's regulatory authority extended only to law-
yers, and not to corporations and laymen, these opinions al-
lowed the bar indirectly to restrict corporations by condemning
lawyers who sought to collaborate with them.
The ABA's committee published two early opinions along
similar lines, neither of which cited specific canons. The first,
issued in 1925, deemed it unethical for a lawyer to be employed
by an automobile club to provide legal services to its mem-
bers. 0 3 The committee reasoned that only lawyers are permit-
Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29
UCLA L. REV. 67 (1981).
98. See OLAVI MARU, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 188
(1970) (indexing first opinion of the New York County Lawyers' Association,
published in January 1912).
99. See id. at 243 (indexing first opinion of New York County Lawyers'
Association, published in December 1923); ABA OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 1 (1967).
100. See N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 24
(1913), indexed in MARU, supra note 98, at 189 (stating that a New York law-
yer may not form a partnership with an out-of-state lawyer); id. Op. 209
(1922), indexed in MARU, supra, note 98, at 207 (explaining that a New York
lawyer may not form a partnership to engage in patent litigation with a patent
attorney who is not a member of the New York Bar).
101. See id. Op. 47 (1914), indexed in MARU, supra note 98, at 191-92
(stating that a lawyer may not split fees with a collection agency).
102. See id. Op. 36 (1914), indexed in MARU, supra note 98, at 190 (ex-
plaining that a nonlawyer printer of legal briefs may not expand into business
of furnishing lawyers to write briefs); id. Op. 47 (1914), indexed in MARU, su-
pra note 98, at 191-92 (noting that a lawyer may not be employed by a collec-
tion agency to perform legal services for its patrons); id. Op. 1 (1923), indexed
in MARU, supra note 98, at 243 (stating that a lawyer may not accept an an-
nual retainer from a membership corporation to defend its members or their
families in legal actions).
103. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 8 (1925).
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ted to practice law, and the authority to do so cannot be dele-
gated to laymen. 104 Since lawyers may not share their respon-
sibilities with laymen, they cannot share their fees with
them.105 Further, it was likely that the lay agency with whom
a lawyer formed a business relationship would solicit business,
which lawyers themselves were forbidden from doing, or that
the agency would "exploit [the lawyer's] professional serv-
ices."106 For these reasons, the committee concluded, the pro-
posed relationship is "abhorrent" and "derogatory to the dignity
and self-respect of the profession." 107
The ABA's second opinion, issued a year later, held that a
lawyer employed as a bank officer may not render legal services
to the bank. 08 The committee principally reasoned that, as an
employee of the bank, the lawyer would lack the professional
independence required of a lawyer, who owes duties to the
court and the public, as well as the client. 0 9 In effect, the bar
employed the logic of the New York court in In re Co-operative
Law Company to countermand the 1909 state legislation, which
had specifically authorized in-house lawyers to represent the
corporations that employed them."10
In 1928, a special committee appointed to propose supple-
ments to the Canons sought to codify the earlier opinions."'
Its proposals, which the ABA approved, provided for the adop-
tion of new canons prohibiting a lawyer from entering into a
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 10 (1926).
109. Id. The Committee provided:
As an employee [a salaried lawyer-trust officer's] only duty is to his
employer. As a lawyer he owes a duty to the Court and to the public,
as well as to his client. Can he consistently act in these dual capaci-
ties at one and the same time? Being dependent on his employer's
pleasure for his livelihood, can he properly observe that independence
of judgment and action that are indispensable to the advocate in
court?... [The lawyer] must be free to exercise his independent
judgment as an attorney for the benefit of the interests he represents,
which he could not be expected to do while under the domination of a
third party as its salaried servant.
Id.
110. See supra text accompanying note 42 (quoting the exception in the
New York penal law).
111. See Proposed Supplements to Canons of Professional Ethics [hereinaf-
ter Proposed Supplements], 13 A.B.A. J. 268 (1927).
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partnership with a nonlawyer, 112 from dividing fees for legal
services with anyone other than another lawyer 113 or from be-
ing employed by a corporation or other organization to render
legal services to others. 114  Of more than a dozen proposals
made by the special committee, its chair identified these as the
most controversial, explaining that there was "substantial dif-
ference of view in the profession respecting" them and that
these differences were "radical and irreconcilable; they embrace
extremes in both directions.""
15
The special committee's report did not offer much justifica-
tion for the proposed Canons other than to explain that consid-
erable work went into developing them.16 However, a member
of the special committee who dissented in small part from its
recommendations offered that the proposals did not embody
"fundamental ethical principles," but comprised "rules of con-
duct which, while they may be advisable, are yet rules of pro-
fessional policy or expediency which are considered necessary
or important to retain and protect the public confidence in the
bar as a part of the administration of justice."117 He explained
that "aside from professional policy.., there is nothing inher-
ently 'unethical' in the formation of partnerships between law-
yers largely engaged in certain kinds of work and an expert en-
gineer, student of finance, or some other form of expert," but
that he had been persuaded "by the views and experiences of
the other members of the committee" that it was necessary to
112. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 33 (1928), reprinted in
ABA OPINIONS OF THE COMMIITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 139 (1967).
113. See id. Canon 34 (1928) ("No division of fees for legal services is
proper, except with another lawyer...."), reprinted in ABA OPINIONS OF THE
COMMIITEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 148 (1967). The provision included an
exception allowing lawyers to share commissions with laymen who forwarded
commercial claims for collection. See id. In the House of Delegates, Julius
Henry Cohen argued that there was no principled distinction between this and
other forms of fee splitting with nonlawyers. See 53 A.B.A. REP. 127-28
(1928). The distinction was defended, however, based on commercial lawyers'
economic self-interest: "[We practicing commercial lawyers are anxious that
our legal fees shall be undisturbed as far as the layman is concerned. We are
not anxious, however, to have the practice of dividing the collection commis-
sion with a layman interfered with." Id. at 127.
114. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 35 (1928), reprinted in ABA
OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 156 (1967).
115. Proposed Supplements, supra note 111, at 270.
116. See id. at 268-69.
117. Id. at 273.
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restrict such relationships "[als a matter of professional pol-
icy. 118
From Professor Wormser's perspective, writing only three
years later, the bar was fighting a rearguard action. Antici-
pating the report of the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice, authored almost 70 years later by Mary Daly, another
Fordham law professor,11 9 Wormser argued:
The facts should be frankly recognized. To deny them is naive and
idle. Corporations to-day are practicing law, medicine and other pro-
fessions. In some instances they are extremely active and successful.
That this new development can be checked entirely is most doubtful.
The best and most sensible method of dealing with the situation is to
recognize it as a definite condition, to abandon theory and outworn
precedents, and to impose on corporations engaged directly or indi-
rectly in the practice of a profession the identical requirements that
are imposed on members thereof. 20
Wormser reasoned "that the same standard of ethics required
of a lawyer can be enforced against the attorney-employee of
the corporation .... Whether the attorney is engaged in inde-
pendent practice, or is a member of a law firm, or is employed
by a fiduciary, his obligations surely are the same."' 2 ' Accord-
ing to Wormser, one ABA President had expressed precisely
this view before taking office.' 22 But, with the adoption of the
new Canons, it appears that the ABA was ideologically commit-
ted to a less sanguine view of lawyers' ability to maintain pro-
fessional standards while collaborating with laymen.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF THE DISCIPLINARY RULES
The 1928 Canons gave ethics committees a textual basis
for their opinions excluding nonlawyers from the field of law.
As the bar's jurisprudence developed, the justifications for the
restrictions were elaborated and refined. The opinions cited
the need for professional independence increasingly, but by no
means exclusively. For example, in 1931 the ABA issued five
opinions citing the new Canons to condemn collaborations with
nonlawyers.123 Typical of these was an opinion holding that a
118. Id.
119. See REPORT, supra note 6.
120. WORMSER, supra note 32, at 178.
121. Id. at 178-79.
122. See id.
123. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op.
31 (1931) (stating that a lawyer may neither accept employment from a corpo-
ration for the purpose of preparing articles of incorporation, nor allow his
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lawyer may not enter into a partnership with or be employed
by a layman who was a "patent agent" admitted to prosecute
patent claims in the Patent Office.124 Although the restriction
against serving as an employee of a nonlawyer was explained
by the need to prevent the lawyer's services from being "con-
trolled or exploited by a layman or a lay agency,"125 the restric-
tion against forming a partnership with a nonlawyer was ex-
plained differently: it protected members of the public who
might be misled or deceived into thinking that the nonlawyer
member of the partnership is in fact a lawyer. 126
Other ABA opinions followed, holding, for exampld, that a
lawyer may not form a partnership with an accountant to give
advice in tax matters and represent taxpayers in administra-
tive proceedings; 127 that an attorney may not be employed by or
form a partnership with an accountant unless he ceases to hold
himself out as -.n attorney and confines his practice to areas
open to lay accountants; 128 that, while a law firm may employ
an accountant, it may not split fees with him;129 that a lawyer
may not form a partnership with a layman to represent patent
applicants before the United States Patent Office, even though
the layman is permitted to render that service, because patent
representation comprises the practice of law when performed
by an attorney; 130 and that lawyers may not practice in corpo-
rate form if any shareholder is a nonlawyer.' 31
Although skepticism periodically surfaced within the bar,
the ABA has officially adhered to the restrictions undergirding
these opinions and, indeed, reinforced them in 1937 by adding a
new canon forbidding a lawyer from aiding "the unauthorized
name to be advertised on the letterhead of said corporation); id. Formal Op. 32
(stating that a lawyer cannot be employed by a layman for the purpose of
prosecuting patent application when the layman gives the public the impres-
sion that his firm practices law); id. Formal Op. 35 (holding that an attorney
may not take on employment in a collection agency to handle contested collec-
tion suits); id. Formal Op. 48 (stating that an attorney may not divide fees
with a layman he employs to make patent searches); id. Formal Op. 56 (stat-
ing that a lawyer may not accept employment from a grange association).
124. See id. Formal Op. 32.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op.
239 (1942).
128. See id. Formal Op. 269 (1945).
129. See id. Formal Op. 272 (1946).
130. See id. Formal Op. 201 (1940).
131. See id. Formal Op. 303 (1961).
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practice of law by any lay agency, personal or corporate."132
When it replaced the Canons with the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 133 the ABA retained this restriction 134
along with those on dividing fees with nonlawyers, 135 forming
partnerships with nonlawyers, 136 and practicing in an entity
owned by a nonlawyer. 137 Rejecting the recommendations of its
drafting commission, 138 the ABA did so again when it replaced
the Model Code with the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 139 combining the latter restrictions in a single rule titled,
"Professional Independence of a Lawyer."140
Following the ABA's lead, state courts adopted ethics codes
containing these restrictions and state and local ethics commit-
tees invoked them, typically in response to inquiries from small
firm and solo practitioners, to place roadblocks in the way of
lawyers who were seeking to ally with other professionals. For
example, beginning in the early 1960s, the ethics committee of
the New York State Bar Association developed an expansive
body of doctrine on this subject, 14' culminating in a succession
of opinions in the 1990s which concluded that a lawyer may
not: team up with a staff leasing company to assist clients in
debt consolidation and financial planning, 42 form a corporation
with nonlawyers to assist homeowners in obtaining real estate
132. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 47 (1937).
133. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983).
134. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-101(A)
(1983).
135. See id. DR 3-102(A) ("A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees
with a non-lawyer ....").
136. See id. DR 3-103(A) ("A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a
non-lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of
law.").
137. See id. DR 5-107(C) (providing that a lawyer may not practice with or
in the form of a professional corporation or association if a nonlawyer has
ownership, membership, or control).
138. See Andrews, supra note 11, at 593-96 (describing proposed Rule 5.4
and the bar's rejection of the proposal).
139. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 5.4 & 5.5 (1983).
140. Id. Rule 5.4.
141. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 557
(1984) (holding that a lawyer and an accountant may not jointly prepare tax
returns and give tax advice); id. Op. 438 (1976) (finding that a bank may re-
quire a borrower to pay the bank's attorney's fees, but an attorney may not
divide the fees with the bank); id. Op. 22 (1962) (stating that if a lawyer enters
a partnership with an accountant, he may not hold himself out as a lawyer).
142. See id. Op. 633 (1992).
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tax deductions, 143 join with a nonlawyer to represent homeown-
ers in small claims proceedings,'" participate in a divorce me-
diation referral service that includes nonlawyers as well as
lawyers, 145 or participate in a program operated by a real estate
broker to offer prospective home purchasers reduced closing
costs.1
4 6
Along the way, the purely formalistic rationale-that, by
allying with a lawyer, the nonlawyers was in effect practicing
law illegally-necessarily receded, since in many situations the
nonlawyers would have been legally authorized to render the
proposed service. Yet, even in these situations, recent opinions
have sometimes resorted to a variation of this argument. For
example, the New York State Bar held in 1984 that a lawyer
may not form a professional relationship with an accountant
who is not a lawyer because the lawyer would thereby "be ena-
bling the accountant to hold himself out to his clients as offer-
ing legal services through the affiliated lawyer."147 The com-
mittee acknowledged that the accountant was legally
authorized to render services relating to taxation and tax plan-
ning, but stressed that when lawyers render the same services,
they are engaged in the "practice of law."148 This presented the
danger, in the committee's view, that clients who sought legal
assistance from the professional association would be misled to
believe that the accountant was assisting them as a lawyer,
rather than as an accountant.149 Additionally, but only secon-
darily, the committee acknowledged the danger that the non-
lawyer-accountant would "direct or control the lawyer's profes-
sional judgment." 50
As jurisprudence developed around the disciplinary restric-
tions, the opinions reflected an expanding conception of the
practice of law, one which swept far beyond the traditional no-
tion that lawyers' work centers primarily on representing cli-
143. See id. Op. 644 (1993).
144. See id. Op. 662 (1994).
145. See id. Op. 678 (1996).
146. See id. Op. 694 (1997).
147. Id. Op. 557 (1984).
148. See id.
149. Out of a similar concern for protecting the public against deception,
the committee further concluded the lawyer and accountant could not place
their names together on letterhead, which might mislead clients to believe
"that the lawyer and the accountant are practicing their respective professions
together rather than independently." Id.
150. Id.
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ents in court and giving advice about legal causes of action and
drafting certain legal documents.15' As the conception of law
practice expanded, the distinction between legal services and
other professional services became increasingly blurry. 152 Law-
yers now saw themselves competing with nonlawyers to render
services, such as tax advice, financial planning, or mediation,
that lawyers and nonlawyers alike were trained and authorized
to provide. By forbidding lawyers-typically, solo practitioners
and small firm practitioners-from allying with accountants
and other professionals, the bar forced clients to make a choice:
clients could hire a law firm (which was free to employ ac-
countants, social workers and other professionals), or a firm of
nonlawyers (which was forbidden from employing lawyers)-
but not a single multidisciplinary partnership of lawyers and
other professionals. The bar would have assumed that law
firms would generally win out in this competition, at least
when the client perceived some need for legal expertise.153
Thus, over time, the effect of the bar association rulings became
less to protect the professional elite from lower-class competi-
tors than to protect all lawyers against competition from non-
lawyers (which, of course, was the acknowledged motivation
behind the restrictions at their inception) and, beyond that, to
expand lawyers' turf.
V. THE CORE VALUES RATIONALE AND ITS EROSION
Bar associations have challenged proponents of multidisci-
plinary practice to demonstrate that the legal profession's core
values, such as loyalty, competence, and confidentiality, will
survive if the disciplinary rules are liberalized. The bar's
premise is that the existing disciplinary rules are needed to
151. See generally Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 2581 (1999).
152. See, e.g., Note, Practice of Law-Drafting of Wills and Trust Declara-
tions-Activities of Banks and Trust Companies, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 96 (1930)
(describing competing views as to whether drafting such documents as wills
and bills of sale comprises the practice of law for purposes of statutes barring
nonlawyers from engaging in law practice).
153. Conversely, the bar probably assumed that if lawyers were free to ally
with other professionals, clients would favor nonlawyer-dominated firms over
both law firms and lawyer-dominated multidisciplinary partnerships. A client
whose problem had a legal dimension would want some access to a lawyer. An
organization largely comprised of nonlawyers would satisfy that need if it had
a lawyer on staff, and at a lower cost than a law firm or lawyer-dominated
firm.
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protect core values. As the previous discussion makes clear,
however, the core values rationale is a belated explanation for
restrictions that, at their inception, were transparently moti-
vated by the financial self-interest of the bar's leadership. Over
the years, the restrictions on alliances with nonlawyers have
been explained in various ways, such as that they are needed to
prevent clients from being misled about the status of nonlaw-
yers or to prevent lawyers from using nonlawyers to solicit
business. Only recently have defenders united around the core
values rationale, which remains a work-in-progress.
The rationale is still developing, in part, because only now
has it come under a serious, open attack. With the exception of
Wormser, early proponents of multidisciplinary practice did not
provide a strong public rationale for encouraging alliances with
nonlawyers; nor did their arguments have much rhetorical
force.154 In the context of the challenge posed in the past few
years by the Big Five accounting firms, however, reformers are
far more effective than their predecessors. They appeal to the
ideas of progress, innovation, client choice, and lawyer mobility,
and portray opponents as hide-bound and protectionist. They
pose the challenging question, "As long as the sophisticated cli-
ent (e.g., a Fortune 500 company) clearly understands the na-
ture of the service provider (e.g., a Big Five accounting firm)
and how it is operating, why shouldn't the client have the op-
tion of receiving legal services and other professional services
from a firm that is jointly owned and operated by lawyers and
other professionals (i.e., accountants), and which, as thus con-
stituted, may better serve the client's needs?"
The core values rationale supplies the following answer:
'Even if the legal services were rendered exclusively by lawyers
in the multidisciplinary firm, these lawyers could not be
counted on to serve skillfully and in accordance with the legal
profession's ethics rules, because they would be subject to pres-
sure from the nonlawyers to cut corners. The clients should not
be allowed to contract to accept service under a different set of
norms from those governing the attorney-client relationship, or
even to assume the risk that the lawyers would violate their
duties to their clients, because their clients would have to be
self-destructive or misguided to do so."155 As thus elaborated,
154. See supra text accompanying notes 83-94.
155. Cf Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional
World: They Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the
Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097 (2000); Neil W. Hamilton, MDPs: View
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the rationale rests on six premises, none of which has been
tested empirically, and all of which are questionable solely as a
matter of reason and experience.
The first two premises are interrelated. The first, "lawyers
are better," implies that lawyers are better qualified than oth-
ers to render legal services by virtue of their superior education
and training.156 The second, "lawyers' rules are better," asserts
that the legal profession's "licensing and disciplinary processes
require adherence to a set of professional norms"-principally
those governing the lawyer's duties of competence, loyalty, and
confidentiality-"that establish the optimal terms for the rela-
tionship between professionals and those to whom they provide
legal assistance.' 57 These assumptions were captured by the
New York State ethics committee when it barred lawyers from
entering into professional relationships with accountants: "[flor
the protection of the public, it is important that legal services
be performed for clients only by duly licensed lawyers who have
been found to possess the requisite legal training and moral
character and who are governed by the high ethical standards
of the legal profession." 58 These assumptions are at the heart
of statutes forbidding nonlawyers from engaging in the unau-
thorized practice of law159 as well as ethics rules prohibiting
lawyers from either assisting nonlawyers in practicing law or
allowing nonlawyers to influence how lawyers themselves prac-
tice law.
The third and fourth premises are also interrelated. One
premise is "nonlawyers are corrupt." That is, even those non-
lawyers who become professionally associated with lawyers will
deviate from the lawyers' professional norms or ethics rules.
This assumption has various explanations. Nonprofessionals
ordinarily have not been trained to adhere to lawyers' profes-
sional standards and, even if they are trained, they are not
subject to a licensing process that is meant to ensure their ad-
herence to these standards. Moreover, some nonlawyer profes-
sionals, such accountants or social workers, are taught an in-
the Big Picture, NATL L.J., Apr. 24, 2000 at A23.
156. See Bruce A. Green, Lawyers as Nonlawyers in Child-Custody and
Visitation Cases: Questions from the "Legal Ethics" Perspective, 73 IND. L.J.
665, 667 (1998).
157. Id.
158. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 557 (1984).
159. See Denckla, supra note 151, at 2594 (explaining that the law rests on
the assumption that "lawyers are both more competent and more scrupulous
than nonlawyers would be in handling legal matters").
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compatible set of standards and are required by their licensing
authorities to adhere to them. 160 At the turn of the twentieth
century, lawyers' public-regarding ethos was considered anti-
thetical to corporations' profit motive; strangely enough, in the
context of the Big Five accounting firms, lawyers' client-
centered duties, such as the duties of loyalty and zealous advo-
cacy, are thought to be incompatible with accountants' public-
regarding ethos (as reflected, for example, in the audit func-
tion). 161
The fifth premise is, "nonlawyers corrupt lawyers." That is,
corrupt nonlawyers will induce the lawyers with whom they
work to abrogate the legal profession's standards. This theme
was sounded in the ABA's 1926 opinion holding that a lawyer
could not provide legal assistance to the bank that employed
him because he could not be expected to render independent
judgment for the bank while "under [its] domination... as its
salaried servant."162 Part of the premise is that nonlawyers are
so lacking in respect for the lawyers' norms that, playing Deli-
lah to the lawyer's Samson, they will pressure lawyers to go
astray. Another part is that lawyers' professional independ-
ence is terribly fragile, so that lawyers will be susceptible to the
others' influence.
The final premise is "lawyer norms are nonnegotiable."
There are two parts to this assertion. The first is that a client
can never make a rational, informed decision to authorize its
lawyer to function under a different set of professional norms
from those that, for the protection of clients, govern the lawyer-
client relationship. Because the legal professional norms are
superior, rational clients would not allow their lawyers to func-
tion differently; any client who did so would presumptively be
self-destructive or the victim of overreaching. Thus, clients
may not consent to representation that is "incompetent" or that
involves "disloyalty" as defined by the rules governing lawyers'
professional conduct. 163 The second part of this principle is
that a client can never make a rational, informed decision to re-
tain lawyers who are allied with nonlawyers in ways currently
160. See, e.g., Statement of Position on Multidisciplinary Practice, supra
note 12, at 594-95
161. See id.
162. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 10
(1926).
163. See Statement of Position on Multidisciplinary Practice, supra note 12,
at 668-69.
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forbidden by the ethics rules and bar associations. The premise
is that the current restrictions on multidisciplinary practice are
necessary to reduce the risk that lawyers will violate the norms
governing the lawyer-client relationship. Accordingly, any cli-
ent who consented to an arrangement forbidden by the profes-
sional regulations would be acting self-destructively or without
sufficient comprehension of the risks.
Whether one finds these premises persuasive depends, no
doubt, on one's intuitions. Are lawyers really so superior in
their ability to assist clients whose problems in any way touch
on the law? Are the bar's rules of conduct necessarily so supe-
rior to other professions' rules? Are nonlawyers so nefarious?
Are lawyers so susceptible? Are clients so incapable of making
intelligent, self-interested choices from an array of options?
If the practice of law were confined to courtroom advocacy,
these premises, and the restrictions on multidisciplinary prac-
tice that build on them, would be considerably less controver-
sial. With limited exceptions, only lawyers may represent cli-
ents in courtroom settings and their training uniquely qualifies
them to do so well.'6 There is a substantial public interest in
requiring lawyers to adhere to the professional norms govern-
ing their work as advocates-norms which, to some extent, re-
quire lawyers to subordinate their clients' interests to those of
164. See Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the
Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 489 (1993) (arguing that lawyers are
not necessarily qualified to represent defendants in criminal cases, much less
in capital cases) [hereinafter Green, Lethal Fiction]; cf Alex J. Hurder, Non-
lawyer Legal Assistance and Access to.Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2267
(1999) (identifying greater public interest in excluding representation by non-
lawyers in connection with legal proceedings as compared with drafting docu-
ments or giving advice unrelated to litigation). To be sure, a substantial num-
ber of individuals are required to represent themselves in court because they
cannot afford a lawyer. See Bruce A. Green, Rationing Lawyers: Ethical and
Professional Issues in the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Clients, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1713, 1713 (1999) ("By now, it is a commonplace observation
that many people in this country cannot afford a lawyer to assist them in ad-
dressing their legal problems, either because they have very little money or
because the cost of legal assistance is too high given the funds available to
them."). There is nothing in the courts' experience with pro se litigants, how-
ever, to suggest that lawyers and nonlawyers are equally well qualified. See
generally Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a Rea-
sonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law
School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879 (1999) (describing
potential role of law school clinics in assisting pro se clients); Russell Engler,
And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of
the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999) (describ-
ing potential role of judicial personnel in assisting pro se litigants).
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the courts, the public, and third parties. 165 In this setting,
there may be greater reason to distrust nonlawyers, who may
have an economic incentive to serve their clients' interests at
the expense of applicable procedural and ethical rules and are
not subject to a licensing system that serves as a counter-
weight. Further, even if it might be reasonable from some cli-
ents' perspective to take the risk that those who represent
them will act contrary to the professional norms, it is not rea-
sonable from the perspective of the public, which has an inter-
est in the fair administration of justice.
This rationale becomes far less compelling, however, when
one considers how broadly the practice of law has been con-
strued. As noted earlier, the bar association opinions hold that
many services that nonlawyers may lawfully provide comprise
the practice of law when provided by lawyers. A 1971 New
York State bar opinion listed the following occupations as ex-
amples: "accountant, collection agency, claims adjuster, labor
relations consultant, business consultant, insurance agent,
marriage counselor, real estate broker, income tax service, [or]
loan or mortgage broker."166 When considering such services,
the claim that lawyers are uniquely qualified has far less force,
as does the claim that lawyers' professional standards are su-
perior to those of accountants, social workers, and other li-
censed professionals. Likewise, one might be skeptical, in con-
texts outside advocacy, that nonlawyers would encourage
lawyers with whom they work to serve clients inadequately or
unethically. The relevant ethics rules, outside the advocacy
setting, are principally those meant to protect the client. In
this context, the nonlawyers' financial incentive would be to
satisfy their clients, presumably by serving clients well. And,
to the extent that clients might receive somewhat different
services from lawyers who were allied with nonlawyers, there
seems to be far less of a public interest in denying them that
option.
VI. THE EROSION OF THE RESTRICTIONS
Since their heyday in the 1920s and 1930s, the restrictions
on multidisciplinary practice have gradually been eroded. To a
small extent, this has been occasioned by occurrences, such as
the Supreme Court decisions permitting attorney advertis-
165. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159-60 (1988).
166. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 206 (1971).
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ing,167 over which the bar had no control and which do not un-
dermine the contemporary, core values rationale for the restric-
tions. To a larger extent, however, the erosion of the restric-
tions-as part of what might be viewed as a common law
process of developing ethics doctrine' 68-calls into question the
five premises that comprise the core values rationale.
First, the assumptions that lawyers have superior compe-
tence to render legal services and that they function under su-
perior professional norms have been steadily eroded by laws
authorizing nonlawyers to render services that the bar regards
as the practice of law. In part, this is a result of the bar's broad
definition of legal services to include virtually anything that is
remotely related to the law.169 As members of other professions
receive training specifically tailored to particular personal or
financial services-for example, psychological counseling or ac-
counting services-it becomes increasingly hard to sustain the
argument that lawyers' general training in the law makes them
best qualified to offer these services whenever the client's
167. For example, in 1962, in one of its earliest opinions, the New York
State ethics committee held that a lawyer may form a partnership with an ac-
countant only if he ceases to practice law. See id. Op. 22 (1962). It was neces-
sary, but not sufficient, that in the context of the accounting firm the lawyer
did not hold himself out as a lawyer and rendered no services that "if rendered
by one holding himself out as a lawyer would be deemed the practice of law."
Id. Additionally, to avoid using the accounting practice as a way of "touting"
himself in violation of the advertising prohibition, the lawyer was forbidden
from separately practicing law. See id.; cf id. Op. 128 (1970); see also id. Op.
135 (1970). In 1971, following the adoption of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, the committee reconsidered the latter restriction. It concluded
that a lawyer may separately engage in another occupation, but held that the
lawyer may not create the impression that the other occupation was related to
his legal practice or use it to feed clients to his legal practice. See id. Op. 206
(1971). It adhered to this restriction until the Supreme Court struck down
wholesale restrictions on lawyer advertising. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350, 384 (1977). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free
Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on Lawyers' First Amendment
Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569 (1998). In light of Bates, the committee con-
cluded that there was no longer any reason why a lawyer could not practice
law and another occupation (e.g., a real estate brokerage business) from the
same office. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 493
(1978).
168. See generally Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee: On the
Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 55 BROOm L. REV. 485 (1989) (arguing that
courts should take a common law approach to interpreting ethics rules rather
than seeking to ascertain the drafters' intent).
169. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, For-
mal Op. 328 (1972) (finding that psychology practice is related to the practice
of law).
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problem has some legal aspect. When spouses require a divorce
mediator, is it really easier for a lawyer to develop the mediat-
ing skills than for a trained mediator to learn the necessary
law? Moreover, even services that would seem to go to the core
of legal practice have been opened to nonlawyers-for example,
advocacy on behalf of clients in administrative proceedings or
small claims court. Increasingly, the laws have come to reflect
a premise that individuals other than lawyers can become
qualified to render many law-related services.'70 At the same
time, the laws providing for the licensing of professionals, such
as accountants and social workers, have chipped away at the
assumption that the legal profession's norms are necessarily
superior ones for professionals rendering law-related serv-
ices. 171
Similarly, the bar associations' own rules and ethics opin-
ions have eroded the assumptions that nonlawyers will dero-
gate the legal profession's ethics standards and will influence
lawyers with whom they work to abrogate these standards. For
example, in 1928, only two years after holding that a lawyer
may not provide legal services to the corporation that employs
him because such an arrangement compromises lawyer inde-
pendence, 72 the ABA amended the Canons to permit a lawyer
to serve as in-house corporate counsel. 7 3 It might be explained
that, because the corporate employer is also the client, the law-
yer will not be pressured to subordinate the client's interests to
those of a third party employer. But what of the danger that
the corporate employer will pressure the lawyer to sacrifice pro-
fessional obligations owed to the public? The assumption of the
original opinion was that this pressure is greater where the
lawyer has a single client who employs him than where the
170. Obviously, nonlawyers are not assumed to be qualified to render all
legal services. For example, nonlawyers are forbidden from representing cli-
ents in most litigation-and criminal litigation in particular. See generally
Green, Lethal Fiction, supra note 164.
171. Cf. Green, supra note 156.
172. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
173. Canon 35, while generally forbidding a lawyer from being "controlled
or exploited by any lay agency," included as an exception that "[a] lawyer may
accept employment from any organization, such as an association, club or
trade organization, to render legal services in any matter in which the organi-
zation, as an entity, is interested .... " ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Formal Op. 35 (1931); see also id. Formal Op. 31 (1931) ("An
attorney may properly, for a salary, devote his entire time to the performance
of legal services for a corporation, provided the legal services performed con-
cern only the corporation's own affairs .... ").
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lawyer, as outside counsel, may be retained by any number of
clients. 17 4 Two years later the ABA rejected this assumption,
presumably because it determined that lawyers, as profession-
als, should be able to stand up to this pressure.
Further inroads were made by later rules and opinions al-
lowing lawyers to be employed by an entity or retained by a
third party to represent a different client. For example, law-
yers may be employed by insurance companies to represent
policyholders, 175 by social service agencies to represent the
agencies' clients, 176 or by the government to represent individu-
als.177 Lawyers may accept compensation from third parties
outside the employment context. For example, they may be
compensated by a parent to represent a child, 178 by a corpora-
tion to represent a corporate officer or employee,179 by the gov-
ernment to represent members of the public (including in pro-
ceedings adverse to the government),180 or by any other third
174. For cases suggesting the difficulty faced by in-house lawyers when
their perceived professional obligations clash with the demands of their corpo-
rate employers, see, for example, Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571-72
(2d Cir. 1975); General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, 876 P.2d 487, 490-94 (Cal. 1994); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d
104, 108-112 (Ill. 1991). Of course, individual lawyers in law firms may face
similar difficulties when their perceived obligations clash with the demands of
their law firm employers. See, e.g., Lahr v. Fulbright & Jaworski, 164 F.R.D.
204, 206-08 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 108-09 (N.Y.
1992).
175. See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Wills, 717 N.E.2d 151, 156-59 (Ind.
1999).
176. See, e.g., Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics, Op. 1997-2 (1997) (addressing confidentiality obligation of law-
yer employed by social service agency to represent child clients).
177. See generally Nicole G. Tell, Note, Representing Police Officers and
Municipalities: A Conflict of Interest for a Municipal Attorney in a [Section]
1983 Police Misconduct Suit, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825 (1997) (discussing ob-
ligations of municipal lawyers under conflict rules when representing munici-
pal employees).
178. See Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Representation of Chil-
dren, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1844-54 (1996) (addressing conflict of interest
arising out of a parent's payment of a lawyer to represent a child); cf N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 74 (1968) (finding that
parents' attorney may not bring lawsuit on child's behalf against parents, but
guardian ad litem appointed upon parents' application may retain a lawyer to
bring the action).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Weissman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12975, at
*29 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.
78 (1968) (stating that a corporation may reimburse employees for legal ex-
penses relating to moves resulting from corporate personnel transfers).
180. See Alan W. Houseman, Restrictions by Funders and the Ethical Prac-
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party to represent another, as long as the lawyer avoids inter-
ference with her professional judgment and the attorney-client
relationship, and as long as the client consents. 181 These ar-
rangements may be distinguished from multidisciplinary prac-
tices on the ground that the third party employer or payor does
not profit from the lawyer's services, but it is not obvious why
this distinction matters. Doesn't the third party have the same
incentive to influence how the lawyer carries out the engage-
ment? Is the lawyer any less susceptible to the third party's in-
fluence?
Moreover, ethics rules and bar association opinions have
permitted certain alliances between lawyers and nonlawyers
for the purpose of rendering legal assistance. Lawyers are
permitted to employ nonlawyers-for example, paralegals and
secretaries-as long as the lawyers take reasonable measures
to ensure that the nonlawyers act consistently with the law-
yers' professional obligations.18 2 Further, the extent to which
lawyers may delegate tasks to nonlawyers has expanded, in the
words of the New York ethics committee, "[flueled by techno-
logical and economic change."183 Why can lawyers employ
nonlawyers, but not themselves be employed by nonlawyers or
enter partnerships with nonlawyers in order to serve others for
compensation? One assumption may be that lawyers have
more control over nonlawyers who work under their supervi-
sion. Thus, lawyers can avoid the improper influences of non-
lawyers employees, but not those of nonlawyers employers and
partners. Another assumption may be that nonlawyers acting
under lawyers' supervision can be trusted to act consistently
with lawyers' ethical obligations. In other words, nonlawyers
are not invariably corrupt.
Other opinions, however, have permitted lawyers to form
partnerships with professionals who function under different
professional standards-namely, individuals authorized to
tice of Law, 67 FORDHhA L. REV. 2187, 2202 (1999) (describing matters in
which offices funded by the Legal Services Corporation may represent eligible
clients); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 69 (1968)
(addressing issues where lawyers are compensated by county to represent in-
digent clients in child welfare cases).
181. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(f) (1983);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(A)(1) (1980).
182. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.3 (1983).
183. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 677 (1995)
(holding that a lawyer may delegate attendance at a real estate closing to a
paralegal, subject to certain conditions).
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practice law in other states or countries. Bar association opin-
ions permit a New York lawyer to form a partnership with an
English barrister'8 4 or a Japanese bengoshi.185 The assumption
is that the training and ethical standards of these foreign law-
yers are sufficiently similar to those of New York lawyers that
one can be confident that the foreign lawyers will preserve cli-
ent confidences and will not otherwise interfere with the New
York lawyers' ability to uphold their professional obligations,
which differ in certain respects from those of their foreign
partners. 86 Why can the same not be said of a New York ac-
countant or a New York social worker? Are their professional
obligations so different from those of New York lawyers-and
to such a greater degree-that they cannot be trusted to respect
their lawyer partners' professional obligations?
Leaving aside the question whether nonlawyers will seek
to corrupt lawyers with whom they collaborate, the assumption
that lawyers would submit to such influence is at odds with the
most fundamental assumption of lawyer professionalism and
self-regulation: that lawyers' professional training and charac-
ter, as certified by the licensing process, together with the dis-
ciplinary process and other institutions of internal regulation,
are sufficient to ensure lawyers' adherence to their professional
obligations to clients and the public. Although lawyers often
find themselves in situations where they might improperly
serve their own interests at the expense of those of a client, 187
or where clients pressure them to ignore obligations owed to
the public or to the court, it is assumed that lawyers will act
ethically.
Finally, inroads have been made into the premise that cli-
ents should never be permitted to negotiate for a lawyer to ren-
der services in accordance with standards different from those
established by the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer
who is licensed in another profession may now offer both serv-
ices to the public simultaneously. 188 For example, a lawyer
184. See id. Op. 542 (1982).
185. See id. Op. 646 (1993).
186. See id. Op. 658 (1994) (stating that New York lawyers may enter into
partnership with Swedish law firm provided they confirm that the partnership
will not compromise their ability to uphold ethical standards).
187. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(c) (1983)
(permitting contingent fee representation).
188. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 687
(1997).
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may practice law while also practicing as a licensed insurance
broker. A member of the public may seek the lawyer's legal ad-
vice about what insurance products to purchase, in which case
the lawyer must serve the client's interest in accordance with
the legal profession's standards governing loyalty and compe-
tence. Alternatively, a member of the public may hire the law-
yer as an insurance broker, in which case the lawyer-broker is
not subject to the professional standards governing the attor-
ney-client relationship. As long as it is clear to the client
whether the lawyer is functioning as a lawyer or as a broker,
the client is free to choose in which capacity he wants the at-
torney to act. One might ask why clients should not be able to
choose in similar fashion whether to retain a lawyer practicing
exclusively with lawyers or a lawyer practicing together with
nonlawyers partners.
VII. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CURRENT DEBATE
If the past is prologue, then the previous examination of
the disciplinary rules' origin and development has various im-
plications for the contemporary debate. First, the crucial ques-
tion for the organized bar as a whole will be how to promote
lawyers' economic interests vis-a-vis nonlawyers. 189 The bar
will continue its effort to expand its professional turf while
avoiding encroachment by nonlawyers. One might expect the
Bar eventually to endorse a seeming compromise that serves
these ends-for example, proposed amendments to the discipli-
nary restrictions to expand the possibility of lawyer-nonlawyer
collaborations, but only in forms in which lawyers would be
economically and professionally dominant.
189. Cf Andrews, supra note 11, at 616-17 (identifying economic protec-
tionism as likely explanation for bar's rejection of proposed Model Rule 5.4,
which would have permitted alliances between lawyers and nonlawyers); see
also Brickman, supra note 55, at 249 (arguing that ABA ethics committee's
approach to contingency fees is motivated by bar's economic self-interest). Re-
cent writings make clear that, for some lawyers, this remains the most impor-
tant concern: "'Multidisciplinary practices may be one of the solutions for
small-firm survival,' says [Charles] Robinson of Robinson & Chamberlain. 'We
are not protected by our licensure right now. We have the same set of issues
the big firms do. We cannot compete.' Jill Schachner Chanen, MDP: The
View From Main Street, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1999, at 77, 77. Further, "[Bob]
Ostertag [former president of the N.Y.S. Bar Association] says solo and small-
firm practitioners would not be able to compete with a national retailer if a
place like Sears, for example, started offering legal services through its
stores." Id.
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Second, the bar will employ the rhetoric of lawyer inde-
pendence and core professional values and invoke concerns
about nonlawyers' professional dominance, to hide its efforts to
promote lawyers' economic dominance. This will be rhetoric
only. There will be no serious effort to gather empirical evi-
dence of whether clients will be ill-served or misled by new
collaborations between lawyers and nonlawyers. Although the
bar's rhetoric may have force, this probably will not be because
of the strength of the underlying reasoning. Reason enough
exists on both sides of the debate. Indeed, proponents of multi-
disciplinary practice could embrace professionalism as justifica-
tion for reducing regulation. After all, if one has faith in law-
yers as professionals, who by virtue of their training and
character will adhere to the legal profession's core values, there
is no compelling need for restrictions designed to protect law-
yers from the pressures or inducements of nonlawyers who
might lead them astray. The effort to reform the present disci-
plinary rules might be characterized not as an attack on profes-
sional values, but as an attack on the unwarranted assumption
that lawyers are too weak to withstand the influence of non-
lawyer collaborators.
Third, in pursuing its perceived economic interest, the bar
will make the most of its enormous home field advantage. The
relevant restrictions are, for the most part, disciplinary rules.
The rules are drafted by bar associations, promulgated by
courts, enforced by disciplinary or grievance committees, and
interpreted by both courts and bar committees. These institu-
tions are dominated by lawyers.
Finally, the debate within the bar will be shaped not only
by the perceived economic interests of the bar as a whole, but
also by the possibly distinct economic interests of its leaders.
Just what those interests are is unclear, however, given the
democratization of the organized bar over the course of the
twentieth century. To the extent that the bar leadership is
comprised of lawyers from large corporate firms, there may be
considerable sympathy toward the Big Five accounting firms,
which have the ability to retain the law firms or refer corporate
clients to them. Other ABA leaders may also be sympathetic
insofar as their bar association work is supported financially by
the large accounting firms, as various work of the ABA has
been in recent years. It may turn out this time around that the
bar leaders are strongly divided. In that event, the multidisci-
plinary practice debate may pose a challenge to the concept of
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the bar as a unified profession, less because of the external
threat by accounting firms and other nonlawyer professionals
to co-opt lawyers, than because of division within the organized
bar itself.
CONCLUSION
The disciplinary rules restricting multidisciplinary practice
are the direct lineal descendant of a 1909 New York State stat-
ute barring corporations from practicing law. Although sub-
stantial legal work was performed at the turn of the twentieth
century by lawyers employed by corporations, the statute's pro-
ponents did not document cases of clients who were harmed by
these lawyers' work or who expressed dissatisfaction with its
quality. The effort to remove corporations from the field was
spearheaded not by clients, but by lawyers whose motivations
were, explicitly, to protect lawyers against competition from
corporations and, at least implicitly, to protect the profession's
native-born, middle- and upper-class elite against competition
from lower-class, urban, immigrant practitioners. Insofar as
the statute was also justified by the need to ensure that law
was practiced in accordance with the legal profession's stan-
dards of conduct, the particular standard cited most often was
the one prohibiting lawyer advertising, which itself grew out of
the professional elite's desire to minimize competition from
lower-class lawyers. This standard has since been eviscerated
by the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions, and would
scarcely be counted among the core professional values.
Over time, as courts interpreted the state statute and as
ethics opinions and disciplinary rules incorporated and then ex-
tended the state statutory restriction, the rationale for banning
lawyer-nonlawyers alliances was refined. The concern for pro-
fessional independence-that is, for protecting lawyers from
the corrupting influence of nonlawyers who might influence
them to sacrifice core professional values for the sake of finan-
cial gain-gradually took center stage. The asserted need for
the restrictions, in order to preserve professional independence,
was based less on experience than on reason or policy, however,
and their need was open to question. As time went on, the un-
derlying rationale and, to some degree, the restrictions them-
selves, were eroded.
Given this equivocal history, it might be argued that oppo-
nents of change should have the burden of proving that the ex-
isting provisions are essential in their present form. At the
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very least, the question ought to be debated openly, honestly
and fair-mindedly, without any presumptions one way or the
other. At the same time, however, the history suggests that
fair-minded debate is not inevitable: when it comes to matters
of lawyer self-governance, reason easily becomes the servant of
economic self-interest. The multidisciplinary practice debate
offers the organized bar a test of whether it can overcome paro-
chial self-interest to engage in fair-minded inquiry and debate
regarding how multidisciplinary practices would actually serve
clients.
